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Bound by the Sins of Another: Civil Forfeiture and the Lack of
Constitutional Protection for Innocent Owners in Bennis v.
Michigan
As criminal prosecutions continue to consume greater amounts
of time and money, law enforcement officials are increasingly turning
to civil remedies such as forfeiture statutes as an alternative method
to punish offenders Forfeiture statutes permit officials to seize con-
traband as well as profits from criminal activities and to confiscate
virtually any "instrumentality" used in connection with a crime.2 For-
feiture actions are simple, allow quick recovery and are extremely
profitable; all proceeds from the sale of forfeited property go directly
to the state coffers.3 Local agencies are often rewarded monetarily
for aggressive forfeiture policies, causing the technique to quickly
gain popularity among cash-strapped law enforcement agencies and
state legislatures.4 At least one jurisdiction has adopted a policy de-
signed to reward individual officers by giving them a percentage of
1. See Mary M. Cheh, Can Something This Easy, Quick, and Profitable Also Be
Fair? Runaway Civil Forfeiture Stumbles on the Constitution, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1, 1-
7 (1994) [hereinafter Cheh, Runaway Civil Forfeiture]; Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional
Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and
Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325, 1325-26 (1991)
[hereinafter Cheh, Constitutional Limits]; Tamara R. Piety, Scorched Earth: How the
Expansion of Civil Forfeiture Doctrine Has Laid Waste to Due Process, 45 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 911, 911-46 (1991). Civil remedies include forfeiture, padlock proceedings, nuisance
abatement actions and evictions. See generally PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, UN-
DERSTANDING FORFEITURE AND RELATED CIVIL ACTIONS IN CRIMINAL LAW (1992)
(describing various civil remedies).
2. See Cheh, Constitutional Limits, supra note 1, at 134042. In considering the pro-
liferation of the use of forfeiture, Cheh notes that while forfeiture was "[o]riginally
intended to reach property that actually was used to commit a crime, it now includes any
property having the most tangential connection to criminal activity." Id. at 1341.
3. See id. at 1342. For example, Broward County, Florida officials seized property
valued at almost $4,000,000 during 1988. See id. (citing Fred Strasser, Forfeiture Isn't
Only for Drug Kingpins, NAT'L L.J., July 17, 1989, at 1, col. 1). From 1990 to 1994, offi-
cials in the small town of Sulphur, Louisiana seized about $5,000,000, primarily by
confiscating cash suspected of being "drug money" from drivers along Interstate 10. See
David Heilbroner, The Law Goes on a Treasure Hunt, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1994,
(Magazine), at 70,70.
4. See Cheh, Constitutional Limits, supra note 1, at 1338-39 (discussing the popular-
ity of forfeiture and the diversity of seizable assets). In Little Compton, Rhode Island,
the seven-member police force was able to purchase "video cameras, police cruisers, an
outdoor pistol range and officers' college tuition" with $3.8 million seized in a single
"hashish bust." Heilbroner, supra note 3, at 73.
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any assets seized under forfeiture laws, further increasing the incen-
tives for aggressive seizures.5
Aggressive civil forfeiture often leads to situations described by
House Judiciary Committee Chairman Henry Hyde as
"Kafkaesque."6 In an unfortunate example, Florida officials seized
5. See Brian McGrory, Only Cops Seem to Like Town's Plan to Offer Cut of Drug
Forfeiture Funds, PHOENIX GAZETTE, Mar. 3, 1995, at A29 (discussing the town of
Helper, Utah, which adopted an ordinance rewarding local officers for aggressive forfei-
ture by giving the arresting officer 12% of the assets seized and splitting an additional 8%
between the backup officers assisting in the seizure); see also Michelle Stevens, Utah
Drug-Seizure Law Goes Too Far, CHI. SUN-TIMES, May 15, 1995, at 25 (arguing that re-
warding individual officers creates a greater risk of corrupt law enforcement personnel).
6. See Linnet Myers, Forfeiture Laws: Fair or Foul? Americans Not Guilty of
Crimes Decry Loss of Property, CIfI. TRIB., Mar. 12, 1996, § 1, at 6. Representative Hyde
supports legislation that would provide greater protection against civil forfeiture in fed-
eral actions. See id. The Federal Drug Forfeiture Statute is codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881
(1994 & Supp. 1996), and is an important part of the modem development of civil forfei-
ture proceedings. This Note does not focus on the Federal Drug Forfeiture Statutes
because they are distinct from the type of state statute at issue here, in that the federal
statutes, unlike many state laws, provide for a limited innocent owner defense. See id.
§ 881(a).
For general discussion and analysis of forfeiture under these federal statutes, see Mi-
chael F. Alessio, Comment, From Exodus to Embarrassment: Civil Forfeiture Under the
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, 48 SMU L. REv. 429 (1995) (analyzing judicial
interpretation of the Federal Drug Forfeiture Statutes and the scope of governmental
power under 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988)); Rick Fueyo, Note, Normative Considerations of
Asset Forfeiture Under the Drug Abuse Control Act-Who Will Protect the People?-The
Judiciary as Vox Populi, 7 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 143 (1995) (describing the history
of forfeiture under the Drug Control Act and analyzing normative aspects of forfeiture);
Stephen H. McClain, Note, Running the GauntleL" An Assessment of the Double Jeopardy
Implications of Criminally Prosecuting Drug Offenders and Pursuing Civil Forfeiture of
Related Assets Under21 U.S.C. §881(a)(4), (6) and (7), 70 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 941
(1995) (analyzing forfeiture cases within the framework of the Double Jeopardy Clause
and focusing on forfeiture under the Federal Drug Forfeiture Statutes); Patricia A.
O'Neill, Note, United States v. One 1973 Rolls Royce: The Confusion Continues in Inter-
preting Drug Forfeiture Statutes, 40 VILL. L. REV. 723 (1995) (analyzing the criminal
nature of 21 U.S.C. § 881 and arguing that the forfeiture statute violates constitutional
protections and fundamental notions of fairness); Michael Schecter, Note, Fear and
Loathing and the Forfeiture Laws, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 1151 (1990). For discussion and
analysis of the innocent owner protections offered by the Federal Drug Forfeiture Stat-
utes, see generally Eric G. Zajac, Tenancies by the Entirety and Federal Civil Forfeiture
Under the Crime Abuse Prevention and Control Act A Clash of Titans, 54 U. PITT. L.
REv. 553 (1993) (analyzing the knowledge and consent provisions of the innocent owner
defense in 21 U.S.C. § 881 and considering forfeiture of property held in tenancy by the
entireties where only one spouse is an innocent owner); Anne-Marie Feeley, Comment,
Forfeiture of Marital Property Under 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a) (7): Irreconcilable Differences?,
37 VILL. L. REv. 1487 (1992) (discussing the effects of forfeiture provisions contained in
the Drug Control Act on property owned by husband and wife as tenants by the entirety);
Anthony J. Franze, Note, Casualties of War?: Drugs, Civil Forfeiture, and the Plight of the
"Innocent Owner," 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 369 (1994) (considering the forfeiture of
property owned by innocent parties due to the illegal conduct of third persons under 21
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$19,000 from Selena Washington, a South Carolina citizen who was
carrying cash on her trip to buy building materials to repair her
Charleston home which was destroyed by Hurricane Hugo. After
stopping Ms. Washington as she traveled down a Florida Interstate
late at night, police seized the cash as suspected drug money.' The
officer did not take Ms. Washington's name or give her a receipt; he
merely took the money and sped away.9 After lengthy negotiations,
Ms. Washington settled with the officials, an alternative cheaper than
an extended legal battle; the sheriff kept $4,000, her attorney got
$1,200 and Ms. Washington got back only $13,800.10
Civil forfeiture is an in rem proceeding brought against property
based on the legal fiction that the property is guilty." These civil
proceedings do not provide many of the protections found in criminal
U.S.C. § 881 and considering the rights of "donees and other post-illegal act transferees"
to claim the protections of the innocent owner defense); J. William Snyder, Jr., Note,
Reining in Civil Forfeiture Law and Protecting Innocent Owners from Civil Asset Forfei.
ture: United States v. 92 Buena Vista Avenue, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1333 (1994) (analyzing
United States v. 92 Buena Vista Avenue, 507 U.S. 111 (1993), and the relationship between
the innocent owner defense and the relation back doctrine, which dictates that under the
Federal Drug Forfeiture Statute, title to the offending property vests in the government
at the time the illegal act is committed, invalidating subsequent transfers to good faith
purchasers); Derrick Wilson, Note, Drug Asset Forfeiture: In the War on Drugs, Is the
Innocent Spouse the Loser?, 30 J. FAM. L. 135 (1991) (outlining the civil forfeiture frame-
work and the innocent owner defense in 21 U.S.C. § 881, and analyzing forfeiture's effects
on personal and real property held in tenancy by the entirety, joint tenancy and equity by
an innocent spouse).
7. See John Dillin, Tracking More Than Just Speed, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct.
4, 1993, at 8.
8. See iL
9. See id.
10. See id. For additional examples of aggressive civil forfeiture, see John Dillin,
When Federal Drug Laws Create Havoc for Citizens, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 28,
1993, at 10. For in-depth analysis and critique of civil forfeiture, see generally LEONARD
W. LEVY, A LICENSE TO STEAL: THE FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY (1996) (considering
the development of civil forfeiture and the problems caused by aggressive forfeiture poli-
cies). Civil forfeiture can also create problems for mortgage lien holders when collateral
is forfeited. See Jeri Poller, Government Forfeiture of Collaterak Mortgagees and the
Innocent Lien Holder Defense, 112 BANKING L.J. 534,541-48 (1995).
11. See Cheh, Constitutional Limits, supra note 1, at 1340. Modern civil forfeiture
evolved from the English common law of deodands which required forfeiture of any
property that caused the death of a "reasonable creature." See Alison Roberts Solomon,
Comment, Drugs and Money: How Successful Is the Seizure and Forfeiture Program At
Raising Revenue and Distributing Proceeds?, 42 EMORY L.J. 1149, 1149-54 (1993)
(discussing the historical development of civil forfeiture). Forfeiture was sanctioned as
early as the Mosaic Law of the Old Testament. See id. For extensive analysis of the his-
tory and development of the law of civil forfeiture, see Jimmy Gurul6, Introduction: The
Ancient Roots of Modern Forfeiture Law, 21 J. LEGIS. 155, 156-59 (1995); Helen M.
Kemp, Presumed Guilty: When the War on Drugs Becomes a War on the Constitution, 14
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 273,277-83 (1994).
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proceedings, 2 and allow forfeiture without actual conviction of any
crime. The relative ease of the seizures permitted by state forfeiture
statutes implicates the Fourteenth Amendment's protection against
deprivation of property without due process. 4 This is especially true
when the owner of the property is not guilty of any wrongdoing and is
unaware that someone else has used the property in the commission
of a crime. These innocent owners are forced to forfeit their property
when they have done no wrong, based solely on the misuse of their
property by another and the resulting "guilt" of the property itself.'Y
In Bennis v. Michigan,6 the United States Supreme Court declined to
provide constitutional protection for these innocent owners and con-
tinued to adhere to the legal fiction that allows states to seize the
"guilty" property of an innocent owner under forfeiture statutes.
This Note first discusses the facts of Bennis, the procedural his-
tory, and the majority and dissenting Supreme Court opinions'
After considering the historical line of cases addressing in rem forfei-
ture and innocent owners, 9 the Note then analyzes the influence of
Bennis within this line of precedent and considers the decision in
light of the judicial philosophy of stare decisis.20 This Note further
analyzes the connection between Bennis and constitutional Double
21Jeopardy arguments in civil forfeiture cases. Finally, the Note con-
siders the ramifications of the decision in Bennis and the implications
for innocent owners in an era of increased and expansive forfeiture
statutes with limited constitutional safeguards.2
12. Criminal procedural protections include proof beyond a reasonable doubt and a
requirement of conviction before property of the accused is forfeited. See Cheh, Consti-
tutional Limits, supra note 1, at 1340. In contrast, the burden of proof for civil forfeiture
is a preponderance of the evidence, and no criminal conviction is required. See id.; see
also Solomon, supra note 11, at 1159 (analyzing distinctions in the burdens of proof).
13. See Cheh, Constitutional Limits, supra note 1, at 1340.
14. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in relevant part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
15. See infra notes 50-101 and accompanying text (discussing the guilty property fic-
tion as it developed in Supreme Court cases).
16. 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996).
17. See id. at 998.
18. See infra notes 23-48 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 49-129 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 130-7Z and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 173-90 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 191-205 and accompanying text.
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In Bennis, Michigan officials sought the forfeiture of an automo-
bile after it was used in prostitution in violation of Michigan's
indecency statutes. 3 John Bennis was arrested after police saw him
engaging in sexual activity with a prostitute in a parked car.4 The car
was owned jointly by John Bennis and his wife, Tina Bennis.2 Tina
Bennis entrusted the car to her husband for transportation to and
from work, but did not know that he would use it to violate the inde-
cency laws.26 After John Bennis' conviction for gross indecency, the
State of Michigan sued to have the car abated as a public nuisance,
calling for forfeiture of the car to the state. The trial court ordered
the car's abatement and forfeiture.2 While the judge recognized his
remedial discretion in protecting the innocent co-title holder, he de-
clined to grant Ms. Bennis half the sale proceeds and ordered all of
the proceeds to go to the state.29
Based on its interpretation of Michigan Supreme Court prece-
dent, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the State
could not abate Tina Bennis' interest unless it proved that she knew
that the car would be used to violate the law. The Michigan Su-
23. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 996; infra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing the
relevant Michigan statutes).
24. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 996.
25. See id In oral argument before the Supreme Court, neither side was able to
specify the exact nature of the joint ownership in the car. See Transcript of Oral Argu-
ment, Bennis v. Michigan, 1995 WL 712350, at *4, *31. Ms. Bennis' attorney responded
to questioning by explaining that automobile ownership was a heavily regulated area, and
that the interests of a co-title holder were most closely analogous to the common law
interests of a tenant-in-common. See id. at *4. He noted that a co-title holder would not
have the right to sell the entire vehicle, and that the Michigan court had assumed that Ms.
Bennis had a "separately protectable interest in th[e] car." Id. at *5-*6. The attorney for
the State of Michigan agreed that the exact nature of the ownership was unclear and
agreed both spouses were required to sign the title to sell a commonly owned vehicle. See
id. at *31. However, he also argued that the nature of the ownership interest was irrele-
vant to the outcome of the case. See id. at *32-*33.
26. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 997.
27. See id. at 996. The State's suit for abatement was based on a set of Michigan stat-
utes. The first declares any vehicle used for prostitution to be a nuisance. See MICH.
COMP. LAws § 600.3801 (1995). A vehicle found to be a nuisance is subject to an order of
abatement directing the removal and sale of the property, and the balance after costs is
credited to the general funds of the state. See MICH. Comp. LAws § 600.3825 (1987).
Finally, the abatement law provides that "[p]roof of knowledge of the existence of the
nuisance on the part of the defendants or any of them, is not required." Id. § 600.3815(2).
28. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 997.
29. See id.
30. See State ex reL Wayne County Prosecuting Atty. v. Bennis, 504 N.W.2d 731,733
(Mich. App. 1993), rev'd, 527 N.W.2d 483 (Mich. 1994), affd sub nom. Bennis v. Michi-
gan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996). The Michigan Court of Appeals also found that the conduct
would not qualify as a public nuisance because only one occurrence of conduct violating
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preme Court reversed, finding that the owner did not need to know
how her vehicle would be used as a condition of abatement under the
statute.3' The Michigan court cited United States Supreme Court
precedent 32 and held that the failure of the statute to provide a de-
fense for innocent owners was "without constitutional
consequence., 33 Tina Bennis appealed to the United States Supreme
Court arguing that Michigan's abatement scheme deprived her of
property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment,.3 and that her property was taken without just compen-
sation in violation of the Fifth Amendment as applied to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment
In Bennis, the Court affirmed the Michigan Supreme Court and
held that statutes requiring forfeiture of property based on use of the
property in a crime, without providing an innocent owner defense, do
not violate the Due Process Clause- of the Fourteenth Amendment or
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.36 Chief Justice
Rehnquist, delivering the majority opinion, grounded the decision on
the historical legal fiction that "'the thing is here primarily consid-
ered as the offender' ,3' and relied on an "unbroken" line of cases
the act was shown and there was no evidence of payment for the sexual act. See id at
733-35.
31. See Michigan ex ret Wayne County Prosecutor v. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d 483, 492
(Mich. 1994), aff'd sub nom. Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996); see also supra note
27 (providing the applicable Michigan nuisance statutes).
32. See Michigan ex ret Wayne County Prosecutor v. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d 483, 493-95
(Mich. 1994) (citing Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974);
Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926); J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States,
254 U.S. 505 (1921); Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395 (1877); United
States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844); The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 1 (1827)), affd sub nom. Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996); see also infra
notes 50-101 and accompanying text (discussing each of the cases in the line of prece-
dent).
33. Michigan ex ret Wayne County Prosecutor v. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d 483, 493-95
(Mich. 1994), aff'd sub nom. Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996). The Michigan
Supreme Court recognized that the abatement proceeding was an equitable action and
was correctly understood as such by the trial judge. See id. at 495.
34. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 998. For the relevant text of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, see supra note 14.
35. The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person shall be ... deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law; nor shall property be taken for public use,
without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The right to compensation for prop-
erty taken by the government, as secured by the Fifth Amendment, was incorporated into
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226,235-41 (1897).
36. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 998.
37. Id. (quoting The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 14).
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rejecting the innocent owner defense.' 8 Although the Court ac-
knowledged a willingness to draw the line when necessary to
constrain expanding forfeiture actions, citing as an example the for-
feiture of an ocean liner because of the activities of a single
passenger, the majority concluded that "'the cases authorizing ac-
tions of the kind at issue here are too firmly fixed in the punitive and
remedial jurisprudence of the country to be now displaced.' ,
The Court found that the forfeiture was neither punitive nor
subject to the Eighth Amendment's limitations on excessive fines40
because it was an equitable proceeding with a deterrent purpose dis-
tinct from its punitive purpose. The majority reasoned that the
failure to protect innocent owners was justified by the important gov-
ernmental interest in deterring illegal activity and by the ease with
which offenders could evade forfeiture actions if the government was
required to prove collusion between the innocent owner and of-
fender.42 Finally, the Court held that this forfeiture was not a taking
in violation of the Fifth Amendment as applied to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment because the property was lawfully trans-
ferred to the state by use of this forfeiture statute, without the
exercise of eminent domain.4
Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion advanced three reasons sup-
porting constitutional protection for innocent owners.44 First, Justice
38. See id.; see also infra notes 50-101 and accompanying text (discussing the cases in
the line of precedent holding the property itself guilty). Interestingly, the Bennis majority
described the line of cases as "unbroken," Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 998, while the dissenters
argued that the question of an innocent owner's constitutional protection had been previ-
ously reserved by the Court. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1010 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see
also infra notes 102-29 and accompanying text (discussing recent cases in which the Court
extended constitutional protections to civil forfeitures, and questioned whether the prop-
erty of truly innocent owners could be forfeited).
39. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1001 (quoting J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United
States, 254 U.S. 505, 511 (1921)).
40. The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor ex-
cessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONsT. amend.
VIII.
41. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1000; id. at 1002 (Thomas, J., concurring) (characterizing
the forfeiture action as "remedial"). Interestingly, the majority seemed to differentiate
the deterrent purpose and the punitive purpose, see id. at 1000, even though deterrence is
one of the traditional aims of punishment, see Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S.
144, 168 (1962) (describing the dual aims of punishment as retribution and deterrence).
42. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1000-01; id. at 1003 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
43. See id. at 1001. The majority relied on United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 492
(1973) for the proposition that "[t]he government may not be required to compensate an
owner for property which it has already lawfully acquired under the exercise of govern-
mental authority other than the power of eminent domain." Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1001.
44. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1003-10 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Stevens urged consideration of the property's use in the crime. While
contraband is always forfeited, he argued that property which is con-
sidered an instrumentality of crime should not be forfeited by an
innocent owner if the property did not actually facilitate the offense.
45
Specifically, he argued that the isolated use of a stationary vehicle is
not an instrumentality of the crime, and that therefore the innocent
owner should not be forced to forfeit the vehicle.", Second, Justice
Stevens contended that this type of forfeiture is punishment, and that
fairness and due process should prohibit the punishment of innocent
people.47 Finally, he argued that such forfeitures constitute punish-
ment which violates the Eighth Amendment protection against
excessive fines, and that the facts of this case presented the place to
draw the line on broad-reaching forfeiture proceedings which deprive
innocent owners of their property.4"
The Due Process Clauses of both the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments prohibit states and the federal government from de-
priving persons of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.",49 Historically, the Court has held that the Constitution allows
in rem proceedings resulting in forfeiture of property, even if the
owner of the property is innocent, based on the legal fiction that "the
thing is ... the offender." 5  This doctrine is grounded in admiral71
law of the early 1800s, beginning with the 1827 case of The Palmyra,
in which the Palmyra, a vessel commissioned by the King of Spain,
attacked several vessels in violation of the piracy laws of the United
States. 2 A federal statute provided for condemnation and sale of
45. See id. at 1004-05 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
46. See id. at 1005 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
47. See id. at 1007 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
48. See id. at 1010 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In a separate dissent, Justice Kennedy
argued that the precedent set in admiralty cases for forfeiture by innocent owners could
continue without extending the principle to every automobile case. See id at 1010-11
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210
(1844), as an admiralty case which could survive as part of the long tradition of forfeiture
of vessels). Justice Kennedy also argued that the state's interest in not having to prove
collusion could be best served by a presumption that the innocent owner could overcome
by showing a lack of involvement or knowledge of the crime. See id. (Kennedy, J., dis-
senting).
49. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see supra notes 14, 35 and
accompanying text (providing the relevant text of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments
respectively).
50. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 684 (1974) (quoting
The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 1, 14-15 (1827)); see also infra note 55 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the use of the guilty property fiction in The Palmyra).
51. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827).
52. See id at 8.
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vessels captured for " 'piratical aggression.' , On appeal to the Su-
preme Court, the owner of the Palmyra argued that the in rem
proceeding against the Palmyra was improper because he had not
been convicted of pirateering in an in personam proceeding.s' The
Court rejected this argument and found that "[t]he thing is here pri-
marily considered as the offender, or rather the offence is attached
primarily to the thing." 5 The Court held that "no personal convic-
tion of the offender is necessary to enforce a forfeiture in rem in
cases of this nature.,
56
In the second admiralty case addressing in rem forfeiture pro-
ceedings, United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 57 the crew of a vessel
engaged in acts of piracy which were not contemplated or authorized
58by the owners. After the vessel and cargo were seized for adjudica-
tion, the owner argued that he was innocent of any crime and that
therefore his property should not be forfeited. 9 Without any refer-
ence to the conduct of the owner, the Court concluded that the
innocence of the owner was irrelevant because "[t]he vessel which
commits the aggression is treated as the offender." 60  The Court
found the rule necessary in these cases because it was almost impos-
sible to enforce the piracy laws and insure indemnity for injured
53. See id. (quoting Piracy Act of March 3, 1819, ch. 77, 3 Stat. 510; Piracy Act of
May 15, 1820, ch. 113, 3 Stat. 600 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1651-61, 3238
(1994) and 33 U.S.C. §8 381-84 (1994)). Chapter 77 of the Piracy Act of March 3, 1819
was cited as Chapter 75 in The Palmyra, and Chapter 113 of the Piracy Act of May 15,
1820 was cited as Chapter 112 in The Palmyra, possibly due to citation of the Acts prior to
publication of the Statutes at Large. See The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 8.
54. See The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 12.
55. Id. at 14.
56. Il at 15. Although the Court rejected the owner's argument and found that the
offense attached to the vessel itself, there was disagreement among the Justices as to
whether the Palmyra was actually guilty of the offense charged. Because the Justices
were split, the Court summarily affirmed the decision of the lower court. See id. Since
some Justices were opposed to the actual condemnation, the decision of the circuit court
was affirmed and the Palmyra was acquitted and ordered returned to its owner. See id. at
15, 18.
57. 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844). This case is sometimes referred to by other names,
including Harmony v. United States and Malek Adhel. See, e.g., Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1004
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
58. See Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 230. The acts of piracy were in viola-
tion of the U.S. Piracy Act of March 3, 1819, ch. 77, 3 Stat. 510 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 1651-61,3238 (1994) and 33 U.S.C. §§ 381-84 (1994)). In this case, not only was
the owner not convicted of any crime, he was completely innocent and unaware of the
uses to which the crew was putting the ship. See id. at 230.




parties without the in rem proceeding.6' However, the Court found
that the cargo was not similarly bound and was "not generally
deemed to be involved in the same confiscation as the ship, unless the
owner thereof co-operates in or authorizes the unlawful act."' 62 Be-
cause the cargo owner was innocent of any violation of the piracy
laws, the Court restored the cargo to the owner; however, the vessel
was condemned for the violation.6'
These principles for in rem proceedings were extended beyond
admiralty law in Dobbins's Distillery v. United States,64 in which the
owner of a piece of land containing a distillery leased the land to a
distillery operator who did not keep the distillery's books properly
and made false entries in order to evade taxes." Based on his alleged
ignorance of the fraud committed by the lessee, the owner challenged
the United States' seizure of his distillery equipment and land.67 The
Court held that real and personal property used in connection with
the distillery was subject to forfeiture for the tax fraud of the lessee,
despite the owner's lack of knowledge. 68 Applying the principle that
the property is the offender, the Court extended the idea from the
admiralty context into an in rem proceeding against real property.69
The revenue statute did not make any exception for innocent owners,
and the Court found that the owner was bound by the fraud or ne-
glect of the person he entrusted with his property, just as the "acts of
61. See id. As noted by Justice Kennedy in his dissenting opinion in Bennis, forfei-
ture of vessels was necessary in order to provide compensation for victims where the
"responsible owners were often half a world away and beyond the practical reach of the
law and its processes." Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1010 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). In Brig Malek
Adhel, the Court noted that smuggling statutes and revenue laws presented similar cir-
cumstances where in rem forfeiture proceedings were commonly used. See Brig Malek
Adhel, 43 U.S.(2 How.) at 233.
62. Id. at 237.
63. See id.
64. 96 U.S. 395 (1877).
65. See id. at 396.
66. See id. at 396-97. The distillery was required to keep proper records and pay
taxes under federal tax laws applicable specifically to distilling operations. See id.; Act of
July 20, 1868, ch. 186, § 19,15 Stat. 125,132 (imposing a federal tax on distilled spirits and
tobacco), superseded by Internal Revenue Code of 1939, ch. 26, 53 Stat. 298, superseded
by Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 595, superseded by Pub. L. No. 85-
859, Title II, § 201, 72 Stat. 1313 (1958) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 5001-691
(1994)).
67. See Dobbins's Distillery, 96 U.S. at 397.
68. See id. at 399.
69. See id. at 400. The Court recognized that the same principles apply to in rem
proceedings in admiralty and cited The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827) and United
States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844). See id.
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the master and crew bind the interest of the owner of the ship."70
This principle was first directly challenged on Fifth Amendment
due process grounds in 1920 in the case of J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant• 71
Co. v. United States. The Grant Company owned an automobile and
sold it to J.G. Thompson, but retained the title as security for the un-
paid balance of the purchase pricey Thompson used the automobile
to transport and conceal distilled spirits which were subject to a tax
that had not been paid.73 The Grant Company did not know of this
use by Thompson and was not involved in the revenue violation.74
The federal revenue laws called for forfeiture of vessels used in the
concealment of commodities on which tax was owed and not paid
with the intent to defraud the United States. 5 The automobile was
seized by the United States, and after a hearing, the court "charged
the jury to render a verdict finding the car guilty. '76 The car was con-
demned and forfeiture entered, and the Grant Company appealed
the decision.? The Supreme Court upheld the forfeiture and con-
cluded that Congress had imposed a duty of care on owners of
property by allowing the property itself to be judged guilty of wrong-
doing and thereby forfeited. 7' Recognizing the constitutional
protections implicated by the issue, the Court explained its reasoning:
If the case were the first of its kind, it and its apparent
paradoxes might compel a lengthy discussion to harmonize
the section with the accepted tests of human conduct. Its
words taken literally forfeit property illicitly used though
the owner of it did not participate in or have knowledge of
the illicit use. There is strength, therefore, in the contention
that, if such be the inevitable meaning of the section, it
seems to violate that justice which should be the foundation
70. Dobbins's Distillery, 96 U.S. at 401. Although fraud was not imputed to the
owner, his property was bound by the acts of those he entrusted with its care; it was the
property, not the owner, that was on trial. See id. at 403-04.
71. 254 U.S. 505 (1921).
72. See id. at 508-09.
73. See id. at 508.
74. See id. at 509.
75. See id. at 508; Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, § 14, 14 Stat. 98, 151, superseded by
Internal Revenue Code of 1939, ch. 26, 53 Stat. 298, superseded by Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 595, superseded by Pub. L. No. 85-859, Title II, § 201, 72
Stat. 1313 (1958) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 5001-691 (1994)).
76. Goldsmith-Grant, 254 U.S. at 509.
77. See id. The Grant Company had posted a bond with security when the car was
initially seized, so the car had already been returned to the Grant Company. See id. at
508. The judgment was actually for $800 and costs against the Grant Company as princi-
pal and J.W. Goldsmith, Jr. as security. See id. at 509.
78. See id. at 510.
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of the due process of law required by the Constitution.
But whether the reason for § 3450 be artificial or real, it
is too firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial jurispru-
dence of the country to be now displaced.79
Six years later, the Court extended the principle to state forfei-
ture statutes in Van Oster v. Kansas. In Van Oster, the owner of an
automobile allowed the vendors who sold him the car to retain it for
use in their business as part of the consideration for the sale."1 An
associate of the vendors used the automobile to illegally transport
intoxicating liquor. Kansas state officials arrested the associate and
seized the automobile as provided by Kansas' forfeiture statute.3
The car was judged forfeited under the Kansas statute, but the asso-
ciate was subsequently acquitted of the offense. 4 The owner of the
car challenged the forfeiture statute as violating the due process of
law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court found
that the statute did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, since it
had been long settled that statutory forfeiture of an innocent owner's
property based on another's use in violation of federal revenue laws
was not a violation of the due process guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment.8 The Court noted that there is no distinction between
the due process guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and that guar-
anteed by the Fourteenth Amendment in these circumstances, and
reasoned that the principle set forth in the earlier cases applied to the
79. Id. at 510-11.
80. 272 U.S. 465 (1926).
81. See id. at 465-66.
82. See id. at 466.
83. See id. The Kansas statute provided that an automobile used in the state for
transportation of intoxicating liquor was a common nuisance which could be forfeited and
sold. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id. The Kansas statute had been construed by the Kansas Supreme Court as
allowing forfeiture of an innocent owner's interest based on misuse of the property en-
trusted to the wrongdoer. See Kansas v. Brown, 241 P. 112, 113 (Kan. 1925), aff'd sub
nom. Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926). The owner of the car was challenging the
constitutionality of the statute allowing this forfeiture. See Van Oster, 272 U.S. at 466.
For the relevant text of the Fourteenth Amendment, see supra note 14.
86. See Van Oster, 272 U.S. at 468; see also J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United
States, 254 U.S. 505, 510-11 (1921) (allowing forfeiture of an innocent owner's interest in
property entrusted to someone who violated tax laws); Dobbins's Distillery v. United
States, 96 U.S. 395, 399 (1877) (allowing forfeiture of real property for a lessee's tax
fraud). The Court in Van Oster also considered the analogy to admiralty law where the
owner is forced to forfeit property entrusted to another based on misuse of the property.
See Van Oster, 272 U.S. at 467.
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state forfeiture statute in this case.8Y The Court recognized that
"certain uses of property may be regarded as so undesirable that the
owner surrenders his control at his peril." 8 The Court also found
that the subsequent acquittal of the associate was a question of state
procedure and did not have constitutional implications for the owner
deprived of his automobile.89
Five decades later, states were using forfeiture statutes to com-
bat illegal drugs rather than the illegal liquor of the 1920s, and the
Supreme Court affirmed their use for this important governmental
purpose. In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,Yo an inno-
cent owner forfeited his yacht when people who had leased the yacht
from him used it to transport marijuana. 9 The owner challenged the
seizure as violating due process and unconstitutionally depriving him
of his property without just compensation in violation of both the
Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments. 9 The Court considered the line
87. See Van Oster, 272 U.S. at 468. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
applies to the federal government and protects against deprivation of "life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. Similarly, the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits any state from depriving any person of "life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. The Van Oster Court found
that there was not "any valid distinction between the application of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the exercise of the police power by the state in this particular field and the
application of the Fifth Amendment to the similar exercise of the taxing power by the
federal government." Van Oster, 272 U.S. at 468. The Court therefore used precedent
upholding civil forfeiture by the federal government under tax statutes to uphold this civil
forfeiture by a state under its police power. See id.
88. Van Oster, 272 U.S. at 467.
89. See id at 469. The car was forfeited even though neither the owner nor the per-
son using the car committed a crime. Thus, a conviction was unnecessary for the
forfeiture to be upheld. See id.
90. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
91. See id. at 668.
92. See ic The forfeiture was challenged under both the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. See id. The Court decided that it was unnecessary to determine which
Amendment applied to Puerto Rico since constitutional protection extended to the
Commonwealth regardless. See id. at 668 n.5 (noting that it was unnecessary to determine
which Amendment applied to Puerto Rico because "there cannot exist under the Ameri-
can flag any governmental authority untrammeled by the requirements of due process of
law as guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States); see also supra note 14
(providing the relevant text of the Fourteenth Amendment); supra note 35 (providing the
relevant text of the Fifth Amendment).
The owner also challenged the lack of pre-forfeiture notice, but the Court held that
the post-seizure notice was consistent with due process because of the "extraordinary
circumstances" of forfeiture. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 678. The yacht was seized
without notice and without a prior hearing, and the owner challenged this lack of notice as
a violation of his procedural due process rights. See id at 668. The Court noted that im-
mediate seizure of property without prior notice or hearing was appropriate where
necessary to secure an important governmental interest. See id. at 678. Because the sei-
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of cases from The Palmyra93 and Bri Malek AdheI,9 through Dob-
bins's Distillery95 to Goldsmith-Grant and Van Oster,97 and held that
forfeiture of property by an innocent owner did not violate the due
process mandates of the Constitution.98 The Court noted the strong
weight of precedent and the long-standing historical fiction that
"'[t]he thing is here primarily considered as the offender.' "99 How-
ever, the Court also observed that in the case of an owner who was
uninvolved, unaware, and had done all that could be expected to pre-
vent the misuse of his property, "it would be difficult to conclude that
forfeiture served legitimate purposes and was not unduly oppres-
sive."' ° Justice Douglas criticized the majority's opinion in his
dissent, arguing that the "ancient" fiction that an inanimate object
could be "guilty" produced circumstances in which the forfeiture doc-
trine could not "be reconciled with the requirements of the Fifth
Amendment."' 0'
After decades of strict adherence to this historical principle, the
Court seemed to ready to change course in Austin v. United States.'tm
zure served important governmental purposes of preventing crime, and because the yacht
could easily be removed or destroyed if notice was given, the Court found that extraordi-
nary circumstances existed so that the owner's due process rights were not violated by the
lack of pre-seizure notice or hearing. See id. at 678-79.
93. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827); see supra notes 51-56 and accompa-
nying text.
94. United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844); see supra notes
57-63 and accompanying text.
95. Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395 (1877); see supra notes 64-70
and accompanying text.
96. J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921); see supra
notes 71-79 and accompanying text.
97. Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926); see supra notes 80-89 and accompany-
ing text.
98. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680, 683-86
(1974).
99. Id. at 684 (quoting The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 1,14-15 (1827)).
100. Id. at 689-90.
101. Id. at 693 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
102. 509 U.S. 602 (1993). For additional analysis of the Court's decision in Austin, see
generally James E. Beaver et al., Civil Forfeiture and the Eighth Amendment After Austin,
19 SEATrLE U. L. REV. 1 (1995) (considering Austin and restrictions on the proliferation
of civil forfeiture); Catherine Cerna, Note, Economic Theory Applied to Civil Forfeiture:
Efficiency and Deterrence Through Reallocation of External Costs, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1939
(1995) (discussing Austin, suggesting a proportionality test for excessiveness under the
Eighth Amendment, and applying economic theory to civil forfeiture "to achieve effi-
ciency and deterrence through reallocation of the external costs associated with drug
crimes"); Mary Ewing di Zerega, Note, Austin v. United States: An Analysis of the Ap-
plication of the Eighth Amendment to Civil Forfeitures, 2 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 127
(1994) (considering Austin, the Drug Control Act, and decisions of lower courts prior to
Austin); W. David George, Note, Finally, an Eye for an Eye: The Supreme Court Lets the
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Richard Austin was arrested after authorities discovered that he kept
cocaine in his mobile home and sold it in his auto body shop."3 After
his arrest, Austin pled guilty to violation of South Dakota's drug
laws, and his home and auto shop were seized in forfeiture proceed-
ings based on their use in the crime.' 4 Austin challenged the
forfeiture as a violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition
against excessive fines.'05 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
"reluctantly" agreed that the forfeiture statute did not violate the
Eighth Amendment, reasoning that "'[i]f the constitution allows in
rem forfeiture to be visited upon innocent owners ... the constitution
hardly requires proportionality review of forfeitures.' ,106
The Supreme Court reversed, stating that that the Eighth
Amendment's application is not limited solely to criminal proceed-
ings or proceedings so punitive "that [they] must be considered
criminal."'17 Instead, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment
limited the power of the government to punish in either civil or
criminal proceedings.1m The Court reasoned that forfeiture statutes
Punishment Fit the Crime in Austin v. United States, 46 BAYLOR L. REv. 509 (1994)
(analyzing civil forfeiture, the Excessive Fines Clause, and Austin, and proposing a pro-
portionality test for excessiveness); Joseph B. Harrington, Note, Austin v. United States:
Forfeiture as Punishment and the Implications for Warrantless Seizures, 4 B.U. PUB. INT.
L.J. 415 (1995) (discussing the decision in Austin and contending that forfeitures under 21
U.S.C. § 881 based on allegations of criminal activity are unconstitutional); Scott A. Hau-
ert, Comment, An Examination of the Nature, Scope, and Extent of Statutory Civil
Forfeiture, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 159 (1994) (describing the history of civil forfeiture,
the decision in Austin, and the use of civil forfeiture within constitutional bounds); Laura
Larose, Comment, Austin v. United States: Applicability of the Eighth Amendment to
Civil In Rem Forfeitures, 29 NEW ENG. L. REv. 729 (1995) (discussing civil forfeiture, 21
U.S.C. § 881, the Eighth Amendment and Austin, and criticizing the Court's analysis of in
rem proceedings).
103. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 604-05.
104. See id.
105. See id. For the relevant text of the Eighth Amendment, see supra note 40.
106. United States v. 508 Depot St., 964 F.2d 814, 817 (8th Cir. 1992) (alteration in
original) (quoting United States v. 300 Cove Rd., 861 F.2d 232,234 (9th Cir. 1988)), rev'd
sub nom. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
107. Austin, 509 U.S. at 607; see Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69
(1963) (highlighting the factors for considering whether a proceeding is so punitive that it
must be considered criminal); see also United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 442 (1989)
(stating that a civil penalty may be so extreme that it constitutes punishment).
108. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 610; see also Halper, 490 U.S. at 447-48 ("The notion of
punishment, as we commonly understand it, cuts across the division between the civil and
the criminal law .... "). The Court in Austin found that civil forfeiture violated the
Eighth Amendment if the punishment was excessive, but did not define "excessiveness."
See Austin, 509 U.S. at 622. For various approaches used in developing and applying tests
after Austin, see United States v. Milbrand, 58 F.3d 841, 847-48 (2d Cir. 1995) (creating a
definition of excessiveness which included the owner's role as a perpetrator of the crime),
cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 1284 (1996); United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 358, 365 (4th Cir.
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were punitive, at least in part, because they were considered punish-
ment at the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified and are also
understood as a form of punishment today.'09 The Court found that
in the line of innocent owner forfeiture cases, the theory that the
property itself is guilty rested on "the notion that the owner has been
negligent in allowing his property to be misused and that he is prop-
erly punished for that negligence."" °  Thus, the Court in Austin
seemed to alter the guilty property fiction and justify forfeiture by
imputing guilt to the owner based on the owner's negligence.
The Court supported its finding that forfeiture was punitive by
reasoning that earlier cases did not impose liability on an innocent
owner who had done everything possible to prevent the misuse of the
property."' The Court also found that the more recent cases of
Goldsmith-Grant?2  and Calero-Toledol" "expressly reserved the
question whether the fiction could be employed to forfeit the prop-
erty of a truly innocent owner. 114  Because the mobile home and
auto shop were not "instruments" of the drug trade, the forfeiture
1994) (adopting an instrumentality test for considering civil forfeiture under the Eighth
Amendment), cert denied, 115 S. Ct. 1792 (1995). See generally Sarah N. Welling & Me-
drith Lee Hager, Defining Excessiveness: Applying the Eighth Amendment to Civil
Forfeiture After Austin v. United States, 83 KY. L.J. 835 (1995) (examining various tests
for excessiveness used by lower courts); Christopher Zemp Campbell, Note, Excessive
Means: Applying the Eighth Amendment to Civil In Rem Forfeitures Under United States
v. Chandler, 73 N.C. L. REv. 2284 (1995) (discussing the Fourth Circuit's
"instrumentality" test and analysis of a real property forfeiture as an excessive fine in
violation of the Eighth Amendment); Clinton Hughes, Note, Justice Through Synthesis:
The Second Circuit Creates a Nonperpetrator Test for Civil Forfeiture Actions, 4 J.L. &
POL'Y 759 (1996) (discussing the Second and Ninth Circuits' response to Austin in the
development of tests for excessiveness of civil forfeitures based on perpetrator status or
culpability of the property owner); Meredith S. Katz, Note, Attorney-General of the State
of New York v. One Green 1993 Four Door Chrysler: Does the Punishment Fit the
Crime?, 12 TOURO L. REV. 715 (1996) (discussing New York's adoption of the Second
Circuit's test for excessiveness of civil forfeitures).
109. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 611. One approach to constitutional interpretation in-
volves considering the circumstances at the time of ratification to determine the intent of
the framers, and considering current circumstances that affect the interpretation. See R.
Randall Kelso, Styles of Constitutional Interpretation and the Four Main Approaches to
Constitutional Interpretation in American Legal History, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 121, 125-26
(1994). Other approaches to constitutional interpretation include consideration of subse-
quent events such as executive or legislative practice, consideration of politics or social
policy, and individual bias. See id.
110. Austin, 509 U.S. at 615.
111. See id. at 616-17.
112. J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921); see supra
notes 71-79.
113. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974); see supra notes
90-101.
114. Austin, 509 U.S. at 617.
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statutes were punitive, rather than remedial, 5 and thus implicated
the Eighth Amendment's protection against excessive fines. How-
ever, the Court declined to adopt a test for excessiveness under the
Eighth Amendment and chose to remand the case to the court of ap-
peals for consideration of the forfeiture in light of the protections of
the Excessive Fines Clause."7
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia argued that the Court
had never determined that negligence of the owner was required be-
fore property could be forfeited, and urged that the Court need not
discuss the owner's culpability to reach the decision in this case.1
Yet despite the urgings of Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, Justice
Thomas, and Chief Justice Rehnquist," 9 the majority of the Court
found that the basis of an owner's liability in forfeiture proceedings
was negligence, and that the earlier cases did not hold property of
truly innocent owners subject to forfeiture.Y°
After Austin, the Court reaffirmed the constitutional protections
for civil in rem forfeitures in United States v. James Daniel Good Real
Property," and extended procedural due process protections to civil
forfeitures of real property.'22 Although the decision in James Daniel
Good did not involve civil forfeiture against an innocent owner, it
followed the trend established in Austin providing constitutional pro-
115. Remedial recovery is generally designed to provide reasonable compensation to
the government for "destruction of government property, losses from fraud or theft of
government property" or interest and costs incurred by the government. Cheh, Constitu-
tional Limits, supra note 1, at 1335. Remedial recovery also includes the "criminal's gains
received as a result to her unlawful conduct" because the profits are broadly compensa-
tory. Id. In contrast, punitive measures such as statutory penalties or fines are designed
to punish the offender. See id.
116. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 621-22.
117. See iL at 622-23.
118. See id. at 625-26 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
119. See id. at 623-29 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id.
at 628-29 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
120. See id. at 616-17.
121. 510 U.S. 43 (1993). See generally Susanne H. Bales, Note, Constitutional Law-
Fifth Amendment Right to Due Process-Civil Forfeiture Defendants and Constitutional
Protection, 62 TENN. L. REv. 331 (1995) (considering the history of civil forfeiture law, 21
U.S.C. § 881, and the Court's decision in James Daniel Good); Tonie M. Franzese-
Damron, Note, United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property: Pre-Hearing Seizure
of Real Property in Civil Forfeiture Cases and the 1993 Trilogy of Restraint, 1994 DET.
C.L. REV. 1293 (1994) (discussing how James Daniel Good limits broad-reaching civil
forfeiture); Peter W. Salsich III, Note, A Delicate Balance: Making Criminal Forfeiture a
Viable Law Enforcement Tool and Satisfying Due Process After United States v. James
Daniel Good Real Property, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 585 (1995) (analyzing James Daniel
Good and the due process analysis in civil and criminal forfeiture).
122. See James Daniel Good, 510 U.S. at 46.
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tections to curb the government's forfeiture power."'2 James Daniel
Good involved the seizure of a home and property four years after
the owner had been convicted under federal drug statutes for the
possession of drugs in his home. 24 Good had paid a fine and served
one year in prison for his conviction.' While Good was away, offi-
cials seized his home without giving notice or opportunity for a
hearing.Y Good challenged the seizure as a violation of his Fifth
Amendment due process rights. 2' The Court noted that "[t]he Gov-
ernment does not, and could not, dispute that the seizure of Good's
home and four-acre parcel deprived him of property interests pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause."' ' The Court found that there was
no "extraordinary situation" that would justify allowing seizure of
real estate without notice and a pre-seizure hearing.
129
123. See id.
124. See id. Good was convicted under HAW. REV. STAT. § 712-1245(l)(b) (1985),
and his house was forfeited under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988). See James Daniel Good,
510 U.S. at 46-47. The federal drug statutes provide protection for innocent owners by
requiring that an innocent owner be compensated for his interest in forfeited property.
See § 881(a)(7). This protection, however, does not eliminate the potential for a wide
variety of inconveniences suffered by innocent owners fighting forfeitures after the prop-
erty has been seized. See supra notes 1-15 and accompanying text. The innocent owner
provision in the federal statute would have protected Ms. Bennis from forfeiture of her
interest in the automobile. Conversely, Michigan's forfeiture statutes did not provide the
minimal innocent owner protections found in the federal statutes. See MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 600.3815(2) (1987) (providing specifically that owner's knowledge of the nuisance
is not a prerequisite to forfeiture).
125. See James Daniel Good, 510 U.S. at 46.
126. See id. at 46-47.
127. See id. For the relevant text of the Fifth Amendment, see supra note 35.
128. James Daniel Good, 510 U.S. at 49.
129. See id. at 53-56. The Court limited the holding to real estate, which is less likely
to be removed or destroyed than personal property. See id. The Court thus distinguished
the house in James Daniel Good from the yacht in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leas-
ing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974), where seizure without notice and without a pre-seizure
hearing was upheld. See James Daniel Good, 510 U.S. at 52-53. The Court also distin-
guished earlier cases which found that seizure of property to enforce federal tax laws was
important enough to justify seizure without more protections of procedural due process.
See id. at 59-61. The Court noted that the collection of taxes before the passage of the
Sixteenth Amendment allowing taxation of income was a matter of "executive urgency"
vital to the government's existence. See id. The Court thus distinguished the lack of
greater protection in cases like Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395 (1878), as
a product of the practical necessities of the times. See James Daniel Good, 510 U.S. at 59-
61.
In an opinion joined by Justice Scalia, Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized the majority
opinion for not giving greater weight to earlier cases allowing seizure of property without
prior notice or hearing, and argued that seizure should be allowed without requiring addi-
tional constitutional protections. See James Daniel Good, 510 U.S. at 70-73 (Rehnquist,
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He reasoned that the seizure served the
important governmental purpose of combating drugs, and that seizure was appropriate
1997]
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While the Court's earliest cases adhered to the "guilty property"
fiction and allowed forfeiture of an innocent owner's property, 0 later
cases seemed to shift toward extension of constitutional protection to
civil forfeiture proceedings? 1 Against this backdrop, the Court con-
sidered the forfeiture of Tina Bennis' car after her husband violated
Michigan's indecency laws without her knowledge or consent. In
Bennis, the majority deviated from the protectionist leanings of Aus-
tin and James Daniel Good, finding that the property interest of a
truly innocent owner could be forfeited without violating the Consti-
tution.1
33
The Court in Bennis recognized that the weight of earlier prece-
dent supported the historical concept that the property was the
offender in in rem proceedings. Based on these decisions, the Court
found that the forfeiture statutes did not violate the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 134 This is consistent with the
doctrine of stare decisis, which provides legitimacy to the decisions of
the Court by respecting and applying prior decisions. 35 Following
this principle in Bennis, Chief Justice Rehnquist considered in detail
since "[g]overnment officials made the seizure rather than self-interested private parties
seeking to gain from the seizure." Id. at 72 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). However, government officials may actually be acting with an incentive
similar to the self-interest of private parties when their agencies will reap the benefits of
lucrative seizures. See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text (discussing the aggressive
use of civil forfeiture by local officials who directly benefit from the proceeds of the sei-
zure). The majority in James Daniel Good noted the government's direct financial stake
in civil forfeiture. See James Daniel Good, 510 U.S. at 56 n.2.
130. See The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 1, 14-15 (1827).
131. See James Daniel Good, 510 U.S. 43; Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
The leanings of Austin and James Daniel Good led many scholars to believe that the
Court was shifting in its approach to civil forfeitures and was extending constitutional
protection to these proceedings. See Cheh, Runaway Civil Forfeiture, supra note 1, at 7-8;
J. Kelly Strader, Taking the Wind Out of the Government's Sails?: Forfeitures and Just
Compensation, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 449, 452-53,473-76 (1996); Bruce Voss, Even a War Has
Some Rules: The Supreme Court Puts the Brakes on Drug-Related Civil Forfeiture, 16 U.
HAW. L. REV. 493,494-95 (1994).
132. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 996-97.
133. See id. at 998. The Court in Bennis distinguished the case of James Daniel Good,
in which the Court found that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause required only
notice and opportunity to contest the abatement in in rem proceedings. See Bennis, 116 S.
Ct. at 998; James Daniel Good, 510 U.S. at 46,52-56. In Bennis the Court refused to allow
an innocent owner to contest the abatement by showing she did not know of the misuse of
the property. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 998.
134. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 998-99; see also id. at 1001 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(noting the importance of "historical prevalence").
135. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (noting that re-
spect for precedent in interpreting the Constitution is indispensable).
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several prior civil forfeiture decisions.'36 The Court recognized the
controlling principle from The Palmyra that the" 'offence is attached
primarily to the thing.' ,137 The Court considered the holding in Brig
Malek Adhel, noting that the interests of the owner were bound re-
gardless of his culpability.' The Court also considered Van Oster,
which held that "an owner surrenders his control [of his property] at
his peril,' 3' as an additional case supporting the notion of forfeiture
by innocent owners.'4 The Court briefly noted the decision in Gold-
smith-Grant as support for the theory that innocent owner forfeiture
was too firmly established to reverse. 4'
In addition, the Court acknowledged that statements in Calero-
Toledo indicated that a truly innocent owner who had done every-
thing possible to prevent the misuse of her property should be
granted constitutional protection.1 42 However, the Bennis Court dis-
missed these statements as dicta and concluded that the holding of
Calero-Toledo supported the notion that property could be forfeited
based on its use in a crime, despite the owner's lack of knowledge.' 43
The Court thus limited its reliance on Calero-Toledo to its "central
holding," dismissing the additional findings in the case.144 Ironically,
adherence to only a "central holding" in stare decisis analysis had
been previously criticized by Justice Scalia and Chief Justice
Rehnquist, 45 but they used this technique to justify their adherence
to the guilty property fiction in Bennis.
Chief Justice Rehnquist continued the majority's analysis of
precedent by considering the Court's decision in Austin;4 7 however,
by limiting the holding of that case, he found that it did not affect the
136. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 998-1000.
137. Id. at 998 (quoting The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1,14 (1827)).
138. See id at 998 (quoting United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210,
234 (1844)).
139. See id. at 998 (quoting Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465,467-68 (1926)).
140. See id. at 998.
141. See id. at 999 (quoting J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S.
505, 511 (1921)).
142. See id. at 999 (quoting Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663,
689 (1974) (noting that it would be difficult to reject the constitutional claim of a truly
innocent owner)).
143. See id. at 999.
144. See id.; id. at 1008 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
145. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 954 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., con-
curring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); ia- at 983 (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
146. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 999.
147. See id at 1000 (citing Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993)).
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decision in Bennis.'4' The Court found that Austin provided only that
forfeiture proceedings are subject to the limitations of the Eighth
Amendment but do not apply to the situation at issue in Bennis. It
did not address the Austin Court's interpretation of earlier innocent
owner cases.150 The majority in Austin found that there was some ba-
sis of fault on the part of the owner whose property was forfeited,
and determined that even in the earlier cases the basis of liability was
negligence.' Chief Justice Rehnquist agreed with the decision in
Austin, but joined Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion specifically
urging the Court not to consider the issue of innocent owner forfei-122
ture. Chief Justice Rehnquist disagreed with the Austin majority's
interpretation of those earlier cases and did not join those parts of
the opinion. 5' Given the opportunity to write for the majority in
Bennis, Chief Justice Rehnquist was able to depart from the position
taken in Austin, which he disagreed with, and solidify the principle
that the property of an innocent owner could be forfeited in an in
rem proceeding.'9
The decision in Bennis also departed from the holding in Austin
that forfeiture proceedings are subject to the Eighth Amendment re-
striction against excessive fines. 55  Although the Bennis Court
acknowledged this aspect of Austin, it found that the Michigan pro-
ceeding at issue in Bennis was "equitable" and abatement was in the
discretion of the judge so that the outcome was not punitive.1 56 The
Bennis Court did not consider the application of the Eighth Amend-
ment to this case or the excessiveness of any fine taken from an
157innocent person.
In his dissent, Justice Stevens asserted that the majority decision
in Bennis was dramatically at odds with the Austin decision, espe-
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. See id. (arguing that Austin did not directly address the validity of the innocent
owner defense).
151. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 616-17.
152. See id. at 628-29 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Justice Scalia also criticized the majority in Austin for engaging in the analysis of culpa-
bility requirements. See id at 625-26 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
153. See id. at 628-29 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
154. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 998, 1001.
155. See id at 1010 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also supra note 40 (providing the text
of the Eighth Amendment).
156. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1000.
157. See id.
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cially in failing to provide for Eighth Amendment protection for the
innocent owner, since even a "modest penalty" was excessive in rela-
tion to Tina Bennis' blameworthiness." Justice Stevens also argued
that Austin provided for some distinction based on the use of the
property as an "instrumentality" of the crime,15 9 while the majority in
Bennis refused to make any such distinction.
The majority in Bennis relied heavily on the doctrine of stare de-
cisis in reaching their conclusion.'6' Yet while the principle of stare
decisis emphasizes the importance of adherence to prior decisions of
the Court, 61 Chief Justice Rehnquist chose to limit the ruling of Aus-
tin rather than to follow the principles it provided.62 Although the
more recent cases in the line of precedent, Calero-Toledo, Austin and
158. See id. at 1010 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
159. See id. at 1004-06 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens argued that the Court
had distinguished property based on its use as an instrumentality in One 1958 Plymouth
Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 699 (1965), J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United
States, 254 U.S. 505, 512 (1921), and Austin. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. 1004-06 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). The Austin Court noted that the property where drugs were sold could not be
characterized as an instrument of the drug trade any more than a car transporting illegal
liquor could be characterized as contraband. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602,
621 (1993).
160. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 998-99.
161. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992); id. at 954 (Rehnquist,
C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). The Bennis Court justi-
fied its decision primarily on the doctrine of stare decisis, which dictates adherence to
prior decisions of the Court. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 998-99. Especially in cases inter-
preting the Constitution, the Court seeks to provide continuity and consider the costs of
overruling a prior decision. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 854 (noting considerations for review
of a constitutional interpretation). The Court will consider the workability of the rule,
whether the circumstances have changed to make the earlier holding unjustifiable, and
whether reliance on the rule would create problems in reversal. See id. (listing factors to
consider in review); see also Kelso, supra note 109, at 138 (noting the settled expectations
which could be upset by overruling a decision).
However, Chief Justice Rehnquist challenged the use of stare decisis based on these
principles alone. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 956-57 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judg-
ment in part and dissenting in part); see also id. at 983 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (agreeing with the Chief Justice's analysis of the
Casey decision). Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized the importance of considering the
error of a constitutional interpretation and its correctness in determining whether to re-
verse the prior ruling, rather than blind adherence to stare decisis based on some notion
of reliance. See id. at 956-57 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part). In a separate dissent, Justice Scalia argued that stare decisis should
apply to the whole decision and should not be used to uphold merely a "central holding,"
which he argued was a contrived use of the stare decisis principle. See id. at 993 (Scalia,
J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). In Bennis, Chief Justice
Rehnquist did not articulate his theory of stare decisis or the weighing of the costs in that
situation; instead he gave great weight to the prior Supreme Court decisions allowing
forfeiture of an innocent owner's property. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 998, 1001.
162. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1000; see also id. at 1010 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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James Daniel Good, leaned toward some constitutional protection
for a truly innocent owner,' 63 the Bennis majority rested its decision
on earlier precedent allowing forfeiture.6 The Court adopted the
position taken in Goldsmith-Grant seventy-five years earlier, finding
that the forfeiture authorized in cases like Bennis was " 'too firmly
fixed in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country to be
now displaced.' "16 Chief Justice Rehnquist justified his decision on
stare decisis grounds, but in doing so, the Court limited it's reliance
on Calero-Toledo and Austin to their respective "central holdings, 16
much like the "contrived" use of stare decisis Justice Scalia previ-
ously criticized in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.
161
In Casey, the Court analyzed the doctrine of stare decisis in a
context unrelated to civil forfeiture. The Court articulated several
factors it should consider when interpreting the Constitution includ-
ing prior holdings, the workability of a rule, and changes in
circumstances which may necessitate a change in the Court's inter-
pretation.'6 In addition, Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized the
importance of considering the correctness of a constitutional decision
rather than blindly following stare decisis." 9 However, Chief Justice
Rehnquist did not undertake an analysis of the stare decisis factors in
the majority's decision in Bennis.1 7' He also chose not to consider the
163. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663,689 (1974) (noting
that it would be difficult to deny constitutional protection to a truly innocent owner); see
also Austin, 509 U.S. at 615-17 (recognizing that the basis of liability for owners in prior
cases was actually negligence).
164. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 998, 1001.
165. ld. at 1001 (quoting J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505,
511 (1921)).
166. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 999-1000 (noting actual holding of cases and limiting
application in this case).
167. 505 U.S. 833, 993 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dis-
senting in part) ("I confess never to have heard of this new, keep-what-you-want-and-
throw-away-the-rest version [of stare decisis].").
168. See id at 854-55. In a recent decision, the Court unanimously acknowledged that
precedents have been overruled where intervening developments have " 'removed or
weakened the conceptual underpinnings from the prior decision, or where the later law
has rendered the decision irreconcilable with competing legal doctrines or policies.'"
Neal v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 763, 769 (1996) (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989)).
169. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 956-57 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
170. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 999-1001. The failure to consider a change in circum-
stances was important in this case because, as Justice Kennedy argued in his dissent, the
rule may have been necessary in admiralty law of the 1800s but was not necessarily re-
quired to enforce Michigan's prostitution law in the 1990s. See id. at 1010-11 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting). In addition, the Court recently acknowledged that victims of seizures in
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correctness of the decision in Bennis, emphasizing instead that the
principle was long established and could not be changed now.71 In
addition to the stare decisis argument, the Court supported this posi-
tion by citing the policy rationale that forfeiture statutes are effective
ways to deter illegal activity and promote law enforcement.'72
The Court's concern for promotion of law enforcement using
civil forfeiture may have been due in part to fear that constitutional
protections for civil forfeiture would require that property of drug
dealers be returned on double jeopardy grounds.'7 After the Court's
decisions in Austin' 4 and United States v. Halper,'7 5 civil forfeitures
revenue cases like Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395 (1877), needed
greater protection because of the "executive urgency" of enforcement of these revenue
laws in the era before passage of the Sixteenth Amendment allowed taxation of income.
See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 59-61 (1993). The
James Daniel Good Court noted that these protections were no longer necessary because
they evolved out of the practical needs of a different time period. See id.
171. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1001. In contrast to his strict adherence to stare decisis,
Justice Scalia criticized the other justices in Casey for their failure to consider "how
wrong was the decision on its face." Casey, 505 U.S. at 983 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part). Chief Justice Rehnquist also noted that the
Court "bows to lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning" and that "[w]hen
it becomes clear that a prior constitutional interpretation is unsound we are obliged to
reexamine the question." Id. at 955 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part). Despite these exhortations, the Chief Justice did not consider whether
the decision in Bennis was wrong on its face, and refused to reexamine earlier decisions
made in the different circumstances of the 1800s and early 1900s. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at
999-1000.
172. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1001; id. at 1003 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
173. For an analysis of civil forfeiture under the Double Jeopardy Clause, see gener-
ally Angela Anderson, Asset Forfeiture as Double Jeopardy, 32 IDAHo L. REV. 545 (1996)
(arguing that because civil forfeiture is "punishment," Double Jeopardy protections
should apply); Andrew L. Subin, The Double Jeopardy Implications of In rem Forfeiture
of Crime-Related Property: The Gradual Realization of a Constitutional Violation, 19
SEATLE U. L. REV. 253 (1996) (analyzing the punitive nature of civil forfeiture and the
implications of the Double Jeopardy Clause).
174. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993); see also supra notes 102-20 and ac-
companying text.
175. 490 U.S. 435 (1989). Halper involved the conviction of the manager of a health
company for making false claims to the government for Medicare for his patients. See id.
at 437 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1982)). Halper was convicted, fined $5,000 and sent to
prison. See id. The federal statute provided for additional civil penalties which amounted
to $130,000, a sum which the court declared bore "no rational relation" to the govern-
ment's loss. See id at 439,451 (citing 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-31 (1982)). The Court found that
this civil penalty was so much greater than the actual loss that it constituted punishment,
and imposition of the penalty would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment by punishing a second time for conduct for which he had already been con-
victed. See id at 451-52. See generally Stanley E. Cox, Halper's Continuing Double
Jeopardy Implications: A Thorn By Any Other Name Would Prick As Deep, 39 ST. LOUIs
U. L.J. 1235 (1995) (analyzing Halper and the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause
in civil proceedings with potential for punishment); Nelson T. Abbott, Note, United
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were generally viewed as punishment entitled to general constitu-
tional protection. Based on these decisions, lower courts began to
overturn forfeitures of drug dealers' property, holding that the sei-
zure and forfeiture of their assets constituted punishment that, when
joined with a criminal conviction for the same crime, violated the
Double Jeopardy Clause.1 76 The Supreme Court considered this issue
in United States v. Ursery'77 only a few months after the Court's deci-
sion in Bennis.'8
In Ursery, officials instituted civil forfeiture proceedings against
Ursery's house because of its use in illegal drug transactions. 79 Urs-
ery was convicted for manufacturing marijuana based on the same
charge."' He challenged the forfeiture as punishment in violation of
States v. Halper: Making Double Jeopardy Available in Civil Actions, 6 BYU J. PUB. L.
551 (1992) (analyzing the Double Jeopardy Clause, Halper, and subsequent decisions by
lower courts); Lauren Orchard Clapp, Note, United States v. Halper: Remedial Justice
and Double Jeopardy, 68 N.C. L. REV. 979 (1990) (discussing Halper and the double
jeopardy protections from punitive civil remedies); Andrew Z. Glickman, Note, Civil
Sanctions and the Double Jeopardy Clause: Applying the Multiple Punishment Doctrine to
Parallel Proceedings After United States v. Halper, 76 VA. L. REV. 1251 (1990)
(considering Halper and double jeopardy analysis in parallel proceedings); Elizabeth S.
Jahncke, Note, United States v. Halper, Punitive Civil Fines, and the Double Jeopardy and
Excessive Fines Clauses, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112 (1991) (same).
176. See United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v.
$405,089.23 United States Currency, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994). The cases were joined
on appeal and were reversed by the Supreme Court in United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct.
2135 (1996). See generally Michael J. Munn, Note, The Aftermath of Austin v. United
States: When Is Civil Forfeiture an Excessive Fine?, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1255 (analyzing
Austin, civil forfeiture, federal drug forfeiture, the Excessive Fines Clause, and tests for
excessiveness that extend constitutional protections to civil forfeiture proceedings);
Robin M. Sackett, Comment, The Impact of Austin v. United States: Extending Constitu-
tional Protections to Claimants in Civil Forfeiture Proceedings, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REV. 495 (1994) (same). The notion of civil forfeiture as Double Jeopardy has also been
linked to arguments that statutes which allow states to revoke driver's or professional
licenses also violate the Double Jeopardy Clause or the Excessive Fines Clause. See Max
Kravitz, Ohio's Administrative License Suspension: A Double Jeopardy and Due Process
Analysis, 29 AKRON L. REV. 123, 136-87 (1996) (analyzing the double jeopardy implica-
tions of a license forfeiture); Dee Potter, Comment, A Critical Look at Texas's License
Suspension Act: Does the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause Prohibit the Revo-
cation of Professional Licenses for Nonpayment of Child Support?, 48 BAYLOR L. REV.
493, 503-05 (1996) (arguing that a license suspension violates the Excessive Fines Clause).
177. 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).
178. Bennis was argued on November 29, 1995 and was decided on March 4, 1996. See
Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 994. During the period between the oral arguments and the decision
the Court granted certiorari to Ursery. See United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 762 (1996).
179. See Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2138-39. Ursery eventually settled the civil forfeiture
claim by paying the government $13,250. See id.; see also 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1994)
(providing for forfeiture of real estate used to facilitate violation of the drug statutes, but
excepting the property interest of an innocent owner).
180. See Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2138-39; see also 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1994)
(prohibiting the manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance).
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the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment."' Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, holding that civil
forfeitures "are neither 'punishment' nor criminal for purposes of the
Double Jeopardy Clause."18' Despite his professed philosophy of ad-
herence to the principle of stare decisis, Chief Justice Rehnquist
distinguished the holdings in Austin ' and Halper,84 finding that they
did not involve a double jeopardy analysis.' ss In his dissent, Justice
Stevens criticized the attempt to distinguish Austin and argued that
"[r]emarkably, the Court today stands Austin on its head-a decision
rendered only three years ago, with unanimity on the pertinent
points-and concludes that § 881(a)(7) [the drug forfeiture statute] is
remedial rather than punitive in character."""s
Faced with the possibility that further extending constitutional
protections in civil forfeiture cases could deprive officials of this drug
enforcement tool on double jeopardy grounds, the Court may have
been hesitant to invalidate the forfeiture in Bennis. The Court in
Bennis denied that civil forfeiture was punishment, despite the con-
trary holding in Austin, possibly with an eye to the upcoming Ursery
case and the anticipated rejection of constitutional protection for civil
forfeiture as punishment."" This is especially true of Justice Gins-
burg, who was the "swing" vote in the five-to-four decision in
Bennis."s During oral arguments in Ursery, Justice Ginsburg repeat-
edly questioned the defense attorney about the application of the
181. See Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2139.
182. See id. at 2149.
183. United States v. Austin, 509 U.S. 602 (1993); see also supra notes 102-20 and ac-
companying text.
184. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989); see also supra note 175 and accom-
panying text.
185. See Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2143-47.
186. Id. at 2158 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part);
see also Too Far on Forfeitures, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1996, at 18 (criticizing the Court in
Ursery for "[s]kipping past recent precedents and ignoring common sense" in allowing
abusive law enforcement seizures without allowing protection based on a "reasonable
reading of the Constitution or basic fairness").
187. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1000; see also Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2149. The Ursery
Court supported its conclusion by noting that "[w]e recently reaffirmed this conclusion in
Bennis v. Michigan .... where we held that 'forfeiture ... serves a deterrent purpose dis-
tinct from any punitive purpose.'" Id. (quoting Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1000). The Court
also cited the proposition in Bennis that forfeiture served important criminal enforcement
purposes by imposing an economic penalty and making illegal behavior unprofitable. See
id. at 2148.
188. See David G. Savage, Innocence Punished: Justice Ginsburg Keys Surprise Ruling
in Double Jeopardy Case, ABA JOURNAL, May 1996, at 47-48 (noting that Justice Gins-
burg's vote upholding the forfeiture of Tina Bennis' interest was surprising because of
Justice Ginsburg's reputation for "liberalism on the bench").
1997]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
recent Bennis decision, and appeared unpersuaded by attempts to
distinguish Bennis.'8 9 Justice Ginsburg may have been reluctant to
extend constitutional protections to civil forfeitures in Bennis be-
cause she was looking ahead to Ursery. It was the Bennis decision
which Justice Ginsburg seemed to use as a basis for denying the dou-
ble jeolpardy protection against civil forfeiture urged by the drug
dealers. 90
The Bennis majority argued that civil forfeiture was an impor-
tant tool for law enforcement officials, and the decisions in Bennis
and Ursery reveal the Court's reluctance to deprive officials of this
tool.' 9' Yet despite the majority's arguments, it appears that Bennis
allows law enforcement agencies to effectively avoid constitutional
safeguards."' Forfeiture statutes are expanding and becoming more
common as an easier, more efficient method of punishment and
crime prevention.' 93 But the reason they are "easier" for law en-
forcement officials is that they deprive citizens of protections
guaranteed by the Constitution for criminal proceedings. 94 As Ben-
nis illustrates, states may expand forfeiture statutes to extremes by
permitting the government to deprive innocent citizens of their prop-
erty without adhering to constitutional protections and without
compensating citizens for the loss.' 95
The majority in Bennis relied on stare decisis and the weight of
the earlier cases to support its decision.'6 Yet the Court limited the
holdings of the two most recent cases in the line of precedent, and
followed principles enunciated in cases originating over one hundred
years ago dealing with entirely different circumstances. 97  It may
189. See Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996)
(No. 95-345, 95-346), 1996 WL 195163, at *62 (Jan. 12, 1996).
190. See i; see also Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2149 (citing Bennis as a recent case support-
ing the principles articulated by the Court in Ursery).
191. See Ivan K. Fong, Paying for White Collar Crime, LEGAL TIMES, July 29, 1996, at
S41 (recognizing that underlying the debate concerning the punitive or remedial nature of
civil forfeiture is the practical concern that civil forfeiture is being more widely used to
"redress and prevent crime").
192. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (describing constitutional protections in
criminal cases which are not provided in civil forfeiture).
193. See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text.
194. See Cheh, Constitutional Limits, supra note 1, at 1340; see also supra note 12
(discussing the protections guaranteed in criminal proceedings).
195. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 997-98.
196. See id. at 1001.
197. See id. at 1000 (omitting any detailed discussion of Austin v. United States, 509
U.S. 602 (1993)); see also id at 1010 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (charging that the majority's
decision was at odds with Austin).
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have been necessary to force forfeiture of pirating vessels in the
1820s when the owners of such vessels were often too far away to be
found; however, that concern does not lead to the conclusion that
admiralty decisions should control forfeiture decisions today.19s
While it is important to follow precedent to ensure the legitimacy of
decisions, stare decisis should not be followed blindly.' 9 The Court
should consider human conduct and citizens' expectations, since deci-
sions which violate basic societal expectations are often the greatest
threats to the legitimacy of decisions."° Most people would expect
that the government's seizure of Tina Bennis' property is exactly the
sort of situation which the Constitution should protect, since the
Fourteenth Amendment provides that states may not take property• 201
without due process of law. The Court undermines its own legiti-
macy by adhering to century-old legal fictions to explain decisions
that fly in the face of common expectations and fundamental fairness.
The government certainly has important interests in working to
punish and prevent crime. Yet these interests can be advanced with-
out extending the reach of forfeiture statutes with no protections for
innocent owners. Forfeiture statutes are available as part of criminal
proceedings and can be used to punish and deter those convicted of a
crime without allowing short-cut civil proceedings. 202 To prevent
collusion between criminal users of property and owners in criminal
proceedings, the Court could adopt a presumption favoring forfei-
ture; if the owner proved that he had no knowledge or connection
198. See Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Would You Like To Forfeit Your
House?, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1996, at A21; James Kilpatrick, From Piracy to Prostitu-
tion: When Forfeiture Is Unfair, ST. J. REG. (Springfield, Ill.), Mar. 19, 1996, at 4; Stuart
Taylor, Jr., A Car Is Not a Pirate Ship, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 11, 1996, at 21.
199. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 954 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., con-
curring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
200. See Forfeiting Fairness, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1996, at 30 (criticizing the decision in
Bennis and noting that "[w]hen the nation's highest court displays indifference to unfair
actions by government against people who have done nothing wrong, it invites cynicism
about the institution and the justice system generally").
201. See Donald A. Dripps, Innocence Is No Defense, TRIAL, June 1996, at 67, 67
(noting that the first paragraph of Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Bennis "sounds
like something straight out of Kafka"); Charles Levendosky, Supreme Court Takes Low
Road On Forfeitures; It Issued Michigan and Other States a License for Theft, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis-St. Paul), Mar. 18, 1996, at 11A (criticizing the Bennis decision for being
"[b]loodless," "[c]allous" and "brutally wrongheaded" for allowing the government to
steal from people and not considering the lives of the people which the decision affects).
202. See Cheh, Constitutional Limits, supra note 1, at 1333; see also Arthur W. Leach
& John G. Malcolm, Criminal Forfeiture: An Appropriate Solution to the Civil Forfeiture
Debate, 10 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 241, 285-95 (1994) (advocating expansion of criminal for-
feiture to avoid continued use of civil forfeiture).
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with the crime, his property interest should be constitutionally pro-
tected from forfeiture. ° In the meantime, state legislatures should
enact innocent owner defenses in their civil forfeiture statutes.2  Al-
though legislatures may be reluctant to take this tool away from law
enforcement officials, constituent pressure against the basic unfair-
ness of forfeiture by innocent owners should help to encourage
adoption of special defense provisions.25 The Constitution provides
important restraints on the power of government and important
guarantees of individual liberty; even in an age of cash-strapped
agencies struggling to contain crime with more efficient tools, these
constitutional protections must not be ignored.
JoI ELIZABETH PEAKE
203. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1011 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that a presump-
tion would be sufficient to prevent collusion).
204. See Forfeiting Fairness, supra note 200, at 30 ("The majority's blindness to Mrs.
Bennis's victimization does not stop Congress and state legislatures from redrafting those
federal and state forfeiture statutes that do not protect innocent parties. Basic fairness
requires no less."). For various suggestions and proposals for reform of civil forfeiture
laws, see William Carpenter, Reforming the Civil Drug Forfeiture Statutes: Analysis and
Recommendations, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 1087 (1994); Raymond P. Pepe, Alternative Propos-
als For the Reform of State Legislation Dealing with Forfeitures for Drug Offenses, 21 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 197 (1995).
205. See Marcia Coyle, Forfeiture Ruling Certain To Spur Reform, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 18,
1996, at A12, col. 3 (noting that the Bennis decision may spur reform efforts at the state
and federal level). Efforts to reform federal civil forfeiture have focused on the Civil
Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, H.R. 1916, 104th Cong. (1995). This proposed act provides
additional procedural safeguards, but innocent owners already have protections for their
interests in property under the federal drug forfeiture statutes. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(4), (a)(6), (a)(7) (1994). More troubling are the many state statutes without any
protection for innocent owners. Cf Dripps, supra note 201, at 67-68 ("One pernicious
consequence of Bennis is that legislatures may be tempted to abolish statutory protections
for innocent owners.").
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